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PENSION PLANS AND ASSOCIATIONS TAXABLE AS
CORPORATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PERSONS
by
Richard L. Mackay*
AN area in which professional persons are at a disadvantage
under present tax laws is in the pension and profit sharing
fields. Whether the professional men are partners or sole pro-
prietors is immaterial.
There have been several recent attempts by professional men,
especially physicians, to devise means whereby they would be put
on an equal footing tax-wise with corporate executives and cor-
porate stockholders who are employees of a corporation. At the
present time officers and shareholders may be among employees
covered by a pension or profit sharing plan for their company.1
Even the chairman of a board of directors may be classified as
an employee and become eligible to participate in a pension plan.
If a pension plan is not designed as a subterfuge for distribu-
tion of profits to shareholders, shareholders who are bona fide
employees of a corporation may participate in the corporation's
pension plan to the same extent as other employees.'
On the other hand, a general partner is not considered an em-
ployee of a partnership and therefore may not participate in the
partnership's pension plan.4 Limited and special partners are
placed in the same category as general partners.5 If a partnership
is succeeded by a corporation, the former partners cannot be
credited for services rendered to the partnership in order to accu-
mulate prior service credits under the successor corporation's
pension or profit sharing plan.6 An individual may establish a pen-
sion plan for his employees, but since he is the employer he can-
not participate in it.7
*A.B., LL.B., University of Cincinnati; member of Ohio, Kentucky, and Texas
bars; member Natural Resources Committee and Publications Committee, Taxation
Section, American Bar Association; attorney, Dallas, Texas.
I U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.165-1 (1953).
2 Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 84 N.E.2d 508 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
8 I.T. 4020, 1950-2 CuM. BuLL. 61.
4 I.T. 3350, 1940-1 Cum. BuLL. 64.
5 Elwin S. Bentley, 14 T. C. 228 (1950).
6 Rev. Rul. 33, Part 2 (b) (1), 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 267, 269.
7P. S. 23 (1944).
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Is it possible for a doctor, an attorney, an accountant, an engi-
neer, or other professional person to be an employee and partici-
pate in a pension plan? This depends upon the source of his in-
come and the control of his activities. If a professional person is
an employee for all purposes, then he may be included in a pension
plan after becoming an employee even though he rendered serv-
ices to the organization on a fee basis prior to that time.8
A quasi-professional person, the full-time life insurance agent,
may be deemed an employee for pension, profit sharing, stock
bonus and annuity plans if he is an employee as defined in the
Code.9 For Social Security purposes, a full-time life insurance
salesman or agent is an employee."i Insurance agents and brokers
who are not full-time agents are not eligible for inclusion in a
plan.1
There are only two cases in the field today on the problem of
having unincorporated organizations taxable as corporations for
professional persons - one is Kintner v. United States 12 and the
other is Pelton v. Commissioner.8
THE KINTNER CASE
Dr. Kintner and several other doctors were engaged in the prac-
tice of medicine in the State of Montana as a partnership. In 1947,
the doctor and his partners formed an unincorporated association
as a successor organization to the partnership. Shortly thereafter,
or in conjunction therewith, a pension plan was set up to cover
the employees of the new association. Included among the em-
ployees of the association were the former partners, made eligible
by the trust agreement as participants. Articles of association,
with a structure similar to a corporation, were drawn, with shares
of stock or "certificate notes" being issued.
The new association set up a contingency reserve, made a con-
tribution to the pension trust fund, began operation as an associa-
tion, and later filed a corporate income tax return.
8 Rev. Rul. 33, Part 2 (b) (2), 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 267, 269.
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 3797 (a) (20), added by 65 Stat. 516 (1951) (now INT.
REV. Con of 1954, § 7701 (a) (20)).
10 INT. R-v. CODE of 1939, § 1426 (d) (3) (B), as amended by 64 Stat. 536 (1950)
(now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3121(d) (3) (b)).
11 Rev. Rul. 33, Part 2 (b) (3) 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 267, 269.
12 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), affirming 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Montana 1952).
is 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
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The Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to give an ad-
vance ruling on the qualification of the association's pension
plan, stating that the association was not taxable as a corporation
since a corporation could not be formed in Montana for the pur-
pose of practicing medicine. An assessment was made against Dr.
Kintner for his allocable share of the contingency reserve and the
contributions to the pension fund by the association, based upon
the old percentage of ownership in the partnership. The doctor
paid the deficiency and immediately instituted suit in the District
Court for refund of the taxes paid.
The District Court found that the association was governed by
a board of directors representing all of the associates; that the
association would continue even though any associate died or
withdrew; that the association held title to the property used by
the association; and that there was centralization of authority in
conducting the operation of the enterprise. The court compared
the association to a corporation and to a partnership. It found
that the association, both in structure and in operation, more nearly
resembled a corporation than a partnership, and therefore should
be taxable as a corporation for all federal income tax purposes.
Since the association was taxable as a corporation, it was en-
titled to deduct the contribution to the pension plan fund, and
that the doctor was not taxable on an allocable portion of this con-
tribution. Further, Dr. Kintner was held not taxable on any por-
tion of the contingency reserve.
Insofar as the pension plan was concerned, the court ruled that
the plan qualified under Section 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 (Section 401 of the 1954 Code), this section per-
mitting the establishment of a pension plan without the approval
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue so long as a certain per-
centage of the employees are covered, and no discrimination exists
against the lower paid employees.
The Internal Revenue Service originally ruled that it would not
give a ruling on the qualification of the pension plan since the
association was not taxable as a corporation inasmuch as forma-
tion of a corporation presupposes a right under state law to in-
corporate the business involved, and that since the practice of
medicine is not one of the purposes for which a corporation could
be formed in Montana, the new association could not be treated
1956]
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as a corporation for any purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
In this, the Commissioner appears to be proposing a new and
additional test for the taxability of associations as corporations:
that state law controls as to the purpose for which an association
may be formed. It is submitted that the Commissioner errs in this
contention since such question has been resolved by many courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Com-
missioner's own Regulations.
The term "association" is not used in the Internal Revenue Code in
any narrow or technical sense. It includes any organization, created for
the transaction of designated affairs, or the attainment of some object,
which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding that its members
or participants change, and the affairs of which, like corporate affairs,
are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board, or some
other group, acting in a representative capacity. It is immaterial whether
such organization is created by agreement, a declaration of trust, a
statute, or otherwise. It includes a voluntary association, a joint-stock
association or company ... and any other type of organization (by
whatever name known) which is not, within the meaning of the Code,
a trust or an estate, or a partnership.1 4
The Commissioner then distinguishes the association from the
ordinary trust, and in the Regulations sets forth further character-
istics of the association and corporation forms:
* *. [T] he trust form affords the advantages of unity of management
and continuity of existence which are characteristic of both associations
and corporations. This trust form also affords the advantages of
capacity, as a unit, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and the
ability to sue and be sued by strangers or members, which are charac-
teristic of a corporation; and also frequently affords the limitation of
liability and other advantages characteristic of a corporation. These
advantages which the trust form provides are frequently referred to
as resemblance to the general form, mode of procedure, or effectiveness
in action, of an association or a corporation, or a "quasi-corporate
form." The effectiveness in action in the case of a trust or of a corpora-
tion does not depend upon technical arrangements or devices such as
the appointment or election of a president, secretary, treasurer, or other
"officer," the use of a "seal," the issuance of certificates to the bene-
ficiaries, the holding of meetings by managers or beneficiaries, the use
of a "charter" or "by-laws," the existence of "control" by the benefi-
ciaries over the affairs of the organization, or upon other minor ele-
ments. They serve to emphasize the fact that an organization possessing
14 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2 (1953).
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them should be treated as a corporation, but they are not essential to
such classification....
... The distinction is that between the activity or purpose for which
an ordinary strict trust of the traditional type would be created, and
the activity or purpose for which a corporation for profit might have
been formed.15
This is the first and only time the Commissioner mentions the
"purpose" for which an organization is formed. Here, of course,
he refers to the purpose of conservation or protection of income
or property as distinguished from the purpose of engaging in a
business activity. What he mentions here has no connection with
his ruling in the Kintner case that formation of a corporation "pre-
supposes" that a corporation may engage in some type of business.
It is submitted that Dr. Kintner did not intend to form a corpora-
tion for the practice of medicine and surgery, but he did intend
to form an association for the practice of medicine. The associa-
tion form for the practice of medicine is apparently permissible
in all states since it is a partnership, and some states permit cor-
porations to furnish medical services through employee physi-
cians, 6 while Wisconsin and Mississippi have several clinics op-
erating in the corporate form for the practice of medicine.
Local law is not important in classification for federal income
tax purposes, and therefore whether the association is classed as
a corporation or as a partnership under state law becomes of no
consequence. There are many court decisions to this effect, but
Regulations 118, Section 39.3797-1 (1953) states it best:
Classification of taxables:
For the purpose of taxation the Internal Revenue Code makes its own
classification and prescribes its own standards of classification. Local
law is of no importance in this connection. Thus, a trust may be classed
15 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-3 (1953).
16 Medical treatment: State ex rel Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581
(1907) ; also King v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 195 Mo. 304, 92 S.W. 892 (1906). Medical
contracts with patients in corporate name: State Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner,
74 Neb. 23, 103 N.W. 1079 (1905). Hospital Corporation for profit charging fees for
services of doctors on salary: Republic Reciprocal Insurance Ass'n. v. Colgin Hospital
and Clinic, 65 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933) ; also Woodson v. Scott and White
Hospital, 186 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Electrotherapy and x-ray: Doumitt v.
Diemer, 144 Ore. 36, 23 P.2d 918 (1933).
Dentists: State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 P. 635 (1905).




as a trust or as an association (and, therefore, as a corporation), de-
pending upon its nature or its activities.... The term "corporation"
is not limited to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation, but
includes also an association, a trust classed as an assocation because
of its nature or its activities, a joint-stock company, an insurance com-
pany, and certain kinds of partnerships.
In distinguishing and defining partnerships "7 and limited part-
nerships," the Commissioner lists the Code classification for an
association which is taxable as a corporation. An example he gives
is this:
A, B, and C contribute $10,000 each for the purpose of buying and
selling real estate. If A, B, C, or D, an outside party (or any combina-
tion of them as long as the approval of each participant is not required
for syndicate action), takes control of the money, property, and busi-
ness of the enterprise, and the syndicate is not terminated on the death
of any of the participants, the syndicate is classified as an association.
The Commissioner goes even further in outlining taxation of
partnership associations:
A partnership association of the type authorized by the Statutes of
several states, such, for instance, as those of the State of Pennsylvania
(Purdon's Penna. Stat. Ann., (Perm. Ed.), Title 59, ch. 3), having by
virtue of the statutory provisions under which it was organized, the
characteristics essential to an association within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code, is taxable as a corporation."9
The Pennsylvania statute mentioned in the above Regulation
gives these elements: capital stock and capital, a lengthy period
of time of existence, dividends, limited liability, managers and
officers, by-laws, and election of officers.
TESTS FOR ASSOCIATIONS TAXABLE As CORPORATIONS
Code and Regulations
Under the Internal Revenue Code and the Commissioner's Reg-
ulations as they are presently written without interpretation by
court cases, the following are the items which will make an asso-
ciation, trust, partnership, syndicate, or other type of organiza-
tion, taxable as a corporation for federal income tax purposes:
17 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-4 (1953).
18 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-5 (1953).
19 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-6 (1953).
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- 1. The organization must be created for the transaction of business.
2. The death of a member or a change in membership must not affect
the continuity of the organization.
3. The organization must resemble a corporation in structure and in
operation.
4. It does not have to be created under statutory authority or with
statutory privileges; a common law organization created with or
without a written agreement may be taxable as a corporation.
5. The affairs of the organization must be run by a representative
group or an individual.
6. It is not necessary to have formal evidence of a corporation, such
as officers, directors, seal, meetings, minutes, etc.
Modification of Tests By Courts
In Hecht v. Malley,2 ° the United States Supreme Court discussed
the difference between an association for income tax and for
excise tax purposes. Under the 1916 statute for excise taxes, the
franchise or license fee was to apply to all corporations or asso-
ciations "organized under the laws of the United States, or State
or Territory." The income tax statute used the phrase "no matter
how created or organized." This particular phrase was incoryo-
rated into the excise tax statute in 1918. The Court stated: "...
[T]he intention of Congress is plainly shown to extend the tax
from one imposed solely upon organizations exercising statutory
privileges, as theretofore, to include also organizations exercising
the privilege of doing business as associations at the common law."
Thus, associations which have "quasi-corporate" organizations
through which they operate a business, are taxable as corpora-
tions. The court approved the definition of an association as "a
body of persons united without a charter, but upon the methods
and forms used by incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some
common enterprise." "
Under Hecht v. Malley and the present Code, an association to
be taxable as a corporation does not have to be a "corporation"
created under the laws of a state, the United States, or a territory.
Most tax cases in the association field have been on trusts taxable
as corporations, and some few partnership cases.
20265 U.S. 144 (1924).
21 1 Bouvim, LAw DICIONARY 269 (Rawle's 3rd Rev.).
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In 1925, the Supreme Court held" that Congress has the con-
stitutional power to tax as a corporation an unincorporated asso-
ciation which transacts its business as if it were incorporated, and
the power of Congress is not affected by the fact that, under the
law of a particular state, the association cannot hold title to prop-
erty. Even though its stockholders are individually liable for an
association's debts, or even though it is not recognized as a legal
entity under the local law, an association may still be deemed a
corporation for tax purposes.2 8
A key line of cases 24 began with Morrissey v. Commissioner,2
all of them establishing landmarks along the way for distinguish-
ing an association or other unincorporated entity taxable as a cor-
poration from one taxable as a partnership. In the Morrissey case,
a trust was formed to sell lots and to construct a golf course and
club house. The trust, to represent the beneficiaries, had a quasi-
corporate form. The beneficiaries did not hold meetings nor elect
representatives to run the trust.lHowever, since the trust was created
as a medium for carrying on a business enterprise with the "bene-
ficiaries" sharing in its gains according to their proportionate
interests in the trust, and the form of the trust was sufficiently
analogous to corporate organization, the court found that Con-
gress intended the income to be taxed in the same manner as that
of a corporation. The court added that the trust method permits
continuity, centralized management, limited liability, facilitation
of transfer of beneficial interests, and introduction of large num-
bers of participants. The term "association," the court said, in
income tax statutory interpretation, embraces an association as it
may have existed or does exist at common law. There is no re-
quirement for organization under a statute or with statutory
privileges.
Upon the authority of the Morrissey case, two circuit courts
held that an organization need not meet all the tests of a corpora-
tion or of a partnership, but rather that the organization be ex-
amined to determine whether it resembles a corporation more
22 Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
23 Hecht v. Malley, supra note 20.
24 Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935); Swanson v.
Comm'r, 296 U.S. 362 (1935) ; Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935).
25 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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closely than a partnership and its status declared in accordance
with the "balance of resemblance." 26
The Sixth Circuit 27 requires "the consideration of each case as
a special, individual and separate problem." There must be a num-
ber of persons (associates) entering into a joint enterprise for the
transaction of business.
In Estate of Hermann Becker v. Commissioner," the Tax Court
summarized the Morrissey prerequisites of an association as: (a)
associates, (b) business purpose, and (c) a combination of char-
acteristics resulting in a closer resemblance to a corporation than
to an ordinary trust.
Most principles in these trust cases are analogous to partnership
and other unincorporated organization situations, insofar as tax-
ability as a corporation is involved.
What is the effect of variations from the usual corporate pro-
cedure? In Alexander Trust Property,9 the Tax Court said:
The provisions of the instrument, even considered in connection with
what was actually done under the instrument, indicate to us that the
points of similarity to a corporation are so numerous in this proceeding
that we must hold it to be so taxable. The variations from usual corpo-
rate procedure pointed out by petitioner, such as conferences between
all the interested parties respecting any important action, are no more
than the departures from usual procedure by a family or closely held
corporation, the affairs of which are often loosely conducted. Nor does
the fact that a corporation could not be organized in Illinois for the
principal purpose of dealing in real estate, prevent this petitioner
from being taxable as an unincorporated association under the Federal
law.
Where there are fixed powers for an agent, even though those
powers are extensive, the organization is not an association."
Delegation of ministerial powers only does not make a taxable
association entity." The "management trust" has been held taxable
as an association."2 However, a family trust for the conservation
26 Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; Comm'r v. Brouillard, 70 F.2d
154 (10th Cir. 1934).27 United States v. Davidson, 115 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1940).
28 2 T.C.M. 341 (1943).
2912 B.T.A. 1226 (1928).
80 A. A. Lewis & Co. v. Commr, 301 U.S. 385 (1937).
81 Comm'r v. Gibbs-Preyer Trusts Nos. 1 & 2, 117 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1941).
82 T. D. 5468, 1945 CuM. BuLL. 332; also Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States, 19 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
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and protection of income is not taxable as an association even
though it carries on a business."
In partnership cases, resemblance to a corporation results in
taxation as an association, 4 while lack of resemblance prevents
classification as an association taxable as a corporation. Where
a partner's liability to creditors of a firm only becomes operative
after exhaustion of partnership assets, taxability as an association
has been found.8" The Cincinnati Stamping Company case had a
similar form of hybrid liability. 7 A partnership has even been
penalized for failure to file a corporate return, even though a
partnership return apparently was filed in good faith.8
Thus, it is seen that court decisions have followed and clarified
the rules previously observed arising from the Code and Regula-
tions. For convenience, the following listing is adapted from Mor-
rissey v. Commissioner:?'
1. Ownership by the entity of property embarked in the undertaking.
2. Centralization of management through representatives of members.
3. Control of management through selection of managers by the mem-
bers.
4. Continuity of enterprise without interruption by death of a member
or a transfer of membership.
5. Limitation of personal liability of members to property embarked
in the undertaking.
The Commissioner's Objections
The Commissioner has asserted three objections to having asso-
ciations taxable as corporations for professional persons in the
practice of their professions.
The first, and probably a specious argument, is the claim that
professional persons practicing their professions, that is, attorneys,
doctors, dentists, engineers, accountants, architects and others,
are not engaged "in business", 40 since the profits of such an asso-
ciation, if formed, would be solely from professional services, not
88 Comm'r v. Guitar Trust Estate, 72 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1934).
36 Goll v. Kavanaugh, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1362 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
85 Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).
86 Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945).
8 4 T.C.M. 806 (1945).
88 West Side Tennis Club v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940).
89 Note 25 supra.
,o Kinter v. United States, supra note 12.
[Vol. 10
PENSION PLANS FOR PROFESSIONALS
from business, that is, not derived from a combination of capital
and labor. In Regulations 118, the Commissioner holds:41 "For the
purpose of the deductions specified in section 22(n) the perform-
ance of personal service as an employee does not constitute the
carrying on of a trade or business. The practice of a profession,
not as an employee, is considered the conduct of a trade or busi-
ness within the meaning of such section." The Commissioner even
lists many major expense items deductible as business expenses
by professional persons." The Board of Tax Appeals long ago
approved the definition of a "trade or business" found in Bouvier's
Law Dictionary -"that which occupies the time, attention, and
labor of men for the purpose of livelihood and profit." ,
The Commissioner's second objection, offered for the first time
in the Kintner case, asserts a new and additional test to determine
whether an association will be taxable as a corporation. The test,
injected into the Kintner case,"' is that the purpose of the associa-
tion must be a purpose that a corporation could have under local
law. Thus, if the association could not have that purpose were it
a corporation under state law, then it cannot be treated as a cor-
poration for federal income tax purposes.
The Supreme Court has thrice refuted this contention. In a
Texas case,' 5 several men formed an association to operate an oil
business. The association was a joint-stock association. Under
Texas law, this type of association is a partnership and a partner-
ship is not an "artificial entity." The shareholders are individually
liable for the association's debts as members of a partnership. The
association cannot hold real property except through a trustee. A
Texas statute permits an association to sue and be sued in its own
name. The United States Supreme Court stated:
... It is true that Congress cannot make a thing income which is not
so in fact. But the thing to which the tax was here applied is confessedly
income earned in the name of the Association. It is true that Congress
cannot convert into a corporation an organization which by the law
of its State is deemed to be a partnership. But nothing in the Constitu-
tion precludes Congress from taxing as a corporation an association
1 iU.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (n)-1 (d) (1953).
42 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a)-5 (1953).
48 Claudian B. Northrop, 17 B.T.A. 950 (1929).
11 Note 12 supra.
"5Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v. Hopkins, supra note 22.
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which, although unincorporated, transacts its business as if it were
incorporated. The power of Congress to tax associations is not affected
by the fact that, under the law of a particular State, the association
cannot hold title to property, or that its shareholders are individually
liable for the association's debts, or that it is not recognized as a legal
entity. Neither the conception of unincorporated associations prevailing
under the local law, nor the relation under that law of the association
to its shareholders, nor their relations to each other and to outsiders,
is of legal significance as bearing upon the power of Congress as to
how and at what rate the income of the joint enterprise shall be taxed.
The second case, Hecht v. Malley, was discussed previously in
this article."' The third case concerns a mail order dental business,
wherein the Supreme Court held the practice of dentistry is a
"trade or business., 4 7
The Commissioner's own regulations on the subject are quite
specific, but the "purpose" under state law for which the associa-
tion was formed is significantly absent as one of his tests.4" When
the Commissioner rules on partnerships,49 trusts,5" and limited
partnerships,' he does not make local law determinative of whether
an association shall or shall not be taxable as a corporation. "For
the purpose of Taxation, the Internal Revenue Code makes its
own classification and prescribes its own standards of classification.
Local law is of no importance in this connection." 52
That the will of Congress may be superimposed upon state law
in classifying types of business organizations for federal tax pur-
poses is indisputably established by many cases.5"
The purpose and operation of an association is more important
in determining taxable status and classification of the organization
than is the form under which it is organized. 4 The "purpose" here
is the aim, intent or design to carry on a business or trade. No re-
46 Note 20 supra.
'4 Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).4sU.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2 (1953).
4' U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-4 (1953).
:0 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797.3 (c) and (d) (1953).
1' U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797.5 (1953).
62 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-1 (1953).
63 Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, supra note 22; also: Standard Paving Co.,
13 T.C. 425 (1949) ; Francis A. Parker, 6 T.C. 974 (1946) ; Comm'r v. Fortney Oil Co.,
125 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1942); Tyrrell v. Comm'r, 91 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Willis B.
Anderson, 6 T.C. 956 (1946); Comm'r v. Brouilard, supra note 26; Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103 (1932).
64 Comm'r v. Vandegrift Realty and Investment Co., 82 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1936).
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gard is given to whether or not the purpose is in accord with
local law.
Congress and the courts have gone far in taxing organizations
which cannot be legally formed under state or federal law, even
taxing illegitimate businesses.5" There are also a few cases speci-
fically holding associations or partnerships taxable other than
according to state law.56
The Commissioner's third objection to use of the association
taxable as a corporation device is that the associate professional
persons are not employees of the association and therefore are not
eligible to qualify for participation in pension or profit sharing
plans.
To define and distinguish between employee and employer
herein, the Regulations57 themselves are quoted.
.Employee.- The term "employee" includes every individual perform-
ing services if the relationship between him and the person for whom
he performs such services is the legal relationship of employer and
employee.... Generally the relationship of employer and employee
exists when the person for whom services are performed has the right
to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not
only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the
details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an
employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as
to what shall be done but how it shall be done. In this connection, it
is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the man-
ner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the
right to do so. The right to discharge is also an important factor indi-
cating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other fac-
tors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every
case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to
work, to the individual who performs the services. In general, if an
individual is subject to the control or direction of another merely as to
the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means
and methods for accomplishing the result, he is not an employee.
Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors,
55 Comm'r v. Heininger, supra note 45; see also: Cohen, et al v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d
394 (10th Cir. 1949).
56Johnson et al. v. Comm'r, 56 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1932), affirming 19 B.T.A. 840
(1930) ; see also: Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1937),
and Pryor and Lockhart Development Co., 70 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1934), affirming 26
B.T.A. 1054 (1932).
5 Employee: U.S. Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.104 (as amended by T.D. 5828, 1951-1
CuM. BULL. 111). Employer: U. S. Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.105 (as amended by T.D. 5828,
1951-1 CuM. BuLL. 111).
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sub-contractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who fol-
low independent trade, business or profession, in which they offer their
services to the public, are not employees.
Whether the relationship of employer and employee exists will in
doubtful cases be determined upon an examination of the particular
facts of each case.
If the relationship of employer and employee exists, the designation
or description of the relationship by the parties as anything other than
that of employer and employee is immaterial. Thus, if such relation-
ship exists, it is of no consequence that the employee is designated as
a partner, coadventurer, agent, or independent contractor.
Employer. - The term "employer" means any person for whom an
individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature, as
the employee of such person.... An employer may be an individual, a
corporation, a partnership, a trust, an estate, a joint-stock company, an
association, or a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincor-
porated organization, group or entity. A trust or estate, rather than the
fiduciary acting for or on behalf of the trust or estate, is generally the
employer.
Does the form of organization of the employer's business have
any effect on the employee-employer relationship or on qualifica-
tion of a pension plan? The following Ruling is by the Pension
Division of the Internal Revenue Service:
Form of employer's business. - There is no requirement as to the
form of business organization the employer must operate under. Thus,
a partnership is not prohibited from installing a pension plan for the
exclusive employees or their beneficiaries. A general partner, however,
is not an employee of the partnership and may not participate in the
benfits of a pension plan which is intended to qualify under Section
165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. 58
Thus, the Commissioner had deemed, up until the Kintner case,
that bona fide employees, employee-associates, and employee-
stockholders, could qualify for participation in pension plans
established by their company.
CASES IN FIELD
There are only three cases bearing directly on the subject of
unincorporated associations taxable as corporations. Because of
their extreme importance in this newly developing field of busi-
ness, economic and tax life of persons engaged in professions, they
58 P. S. 23 (1944).
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will be reviewed more thoroughly than cases previously cited.
The first case, in point of time, was Pelton v. Commissioner, 5
wherein the Commissioner was successful in attempting to have a
trust established for the practice of medicine by a group of doctors
held taxable as a corporation. For seven years, Dr. Pelton, his son
and one other doctor were engaged in the practice of medicine in
Illinois as a partnership. In 1920, these doctors created a trust to
hold title to the office furniture, equipment, instruments, library
and x-ray equipment. The trustees were authorized to use this
property in any way they saw fit and to operate clinics, to retain
professional assistance and generally conduct a medical and sur-
gical business. These trustees were to receive a salary at so much
per year. Vacancies among the trustees were to be filled by the
beneficiaries. The trust was to last for ten years and could be
amended by the holders of 51% of the beneficial interests. These
interests were represented by shares, which were transferable. The
other trust beneficiaries had first option to purchase. The pro-
portionate share of each doctor was determined by his agreed
value to the clinic based upon earning capacity and not on the
property contributed. The clinic employed from one to three addi-
tional doctors. The doctors claimed that their tax liability was that
of a partnership rather than as an unincorporated association
taxable as a corporation.
The Seventh Circuit Court, basing its decision upon the Mor.
rissey case and those following it, determined that the trust was
an association taxable as a corporation because (a) it was carry-
ing on a business enterprise for profit and (b) it had substantial
resemblance to a corporation. In the court's language:
Here, through the medium of a trust, the parties secured centralized
management of their enterprise, and its continuity during the trust term
without termination or interruption by death or changes in the owner-
ship of interests, and with limited liability and transferable beneficial
interests evidenced by certificates. Entering into a joint undertaking
they avoided the characteristic responsibilities of partners and secured
advantages analogous to those which pertain to corporate organiza-
tion. The fact that meetings were not held, or that particular forms of
corporate procedure were absent is not controlling.
The doctors called the court's attention to a then recent decision
59 Note 13 supra.
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of the Illinois Supreme Court which had held that a corporation
could not practice medicine in Illinois. 0 The Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument, stating that the statute and regulations suf-
ficiently covered the situation in providing that "organizations are
associations within the meaning of the statute even though under
State law such organizations are technically partnerships."
The second case in the field was Mobile Bar Pilots Association v.
Commissioner," in which the Commissioner unsuccessfully sought
to convince the Fifth Circuit Court that a group of pilots sharing
common office expenses should be taxed as a corporation. After this
case was decided, the Commissioner asserted that it in effect over-
ruled the Pelton case. These were the facts as established in the
Mobile Bar Pilots case: the pilot was a servant of the vessel, and
the owner of the vessel was liable to third persons for the pilot's
negligence or want of skill. The owner of the vessel controlled the
working hours, duties, etc. of the pilot engaged by his boat. In the
association itself, the association was not liable for acts of the
pilot; it collected fee charges made by the pilots in the individual
names of the pilots; the association owned no property, had no
income and was merely a collection and bookkeeping agency; the
organization could not discharge a pilot as a member; policy and
control of the association were by joint agreement of all of the
pilots while management was by office clerks acting as agents for
the pilots; the purpose of the association was to provide a head-
quarters for the convenience of shippers so that a pilot could
be called when needed.
It is submitted that the Mobile Bar Pilots case did not have the
same fact situation as the Pelton case and therefore did not over-
rule or contradict any portion of the latter. It is apparent that the
bar pilots merely had an arrangement for the splitting of common
expenses, but entire control over their activities, fees within limits
set by law, and power to work or not was retained by the pilots.
This organization did not have centralized management, continuity
of organization, ownership of property by the entity, ownership of
fees or other income by the entity, responsibility for acts of its
members, transferable interests, or limited liability.
60 People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
61 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938).
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The third case in the field is the Kintner case, discussed briefly
earlier. These are the basic points established by the evidence: the
association was liable for the acts of the members; it owned all of
the property embarked in the undertaking and was entitled to re-
ceive all fees charged in its own name for its own use; charges
for professional services were set by the association rather than
the individual doctors performing the services; the association
hired and discharged doctors, including doctor-associates; doctors'
activities, working time, vacation time, place of business and
assignments of work were controlled by the organization. Policy
and control of the association was vested in a Board of Directors,
the Board being an elective body representing the entire member-
ship. Operation and direction was by a management committee
selected by the Board of Directors. Stock was issued by the organi-
zation and made transferrable. Continuity of the group was as-
sured despite change in membership due to death, withdrawal or
retirement of a member. The purpose of the association was to pro-
vide centralized authority and management, to establish continuity
of the business, to reduce turnover of personnel, to permit fairly
easy transfer of interests within a class, to establish and maintain
permanent personnel relations, and to provide relative security
for all personnel through planned pension programming.
Several months subsequent to the Ninth Circuit Court decision in
the Kintner case,62 the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 56-23.
Because of the importance it has had in influencing local enforce-
ment agents of the Internal Revenue Service, it follows in full:
Advice has been requested whether an association of doctors which
formerly operated as a partnership may be treated as a corporation
for Federal income tax purposes and further whether a doctor-member
of the former partnership was an employee of the partnership for the
purpose of the requirements for establishing a pension plan under
section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, corresponding
to section 165 (a) of the 1939 Code.
These questions are posed because of the decision in United States v.
Arthur R. Kintner et ux, 216 F.2d 418. In that case, on the author-
ity of Ora L. Pelton, Sr. et al., Trustees v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
437, the court held that the association had more of the criteria of a
corporation than of a partnership under T. A. Morrissey et al., Trustees,
v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, Ct. D. 1064, C.B. XV-1, 264 (1936),
62 Note 12 supra.
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and it distinguished Mobile Bar Pilots Association v. Commissioner, 97
F.2d 695, Ct. D. 1417, C.B. 1939-2, 244, relating to the perform-
ance of pilotage services by an association of pilots. Having determined
that the clinic in the Kintner case is an association which is treated
for tax purposes as a corporation, notwithstanding the State does not
include the practice of medicine in the listing of purposes for which
a corporation may be formed, the court further held that the pension
plan established by the association satisfies the requirements of section
165 (a) of the 1939 Code. In reaching this conclusion, the court
credited the doctor-members with prior years of service as partners
as constituting qualifying years of employment for purposes of the
pension plan of the association.
It is held that a group of doctors who adopt the form of an association
in order to obtain the benefits of corporate status for purposes of sec-
tion 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is in substance a
partnership for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. It follows
that the doctor-members are employers and therefore not employees.
Rev. Rul. 33, Part 2(a) (1), C.B. 1953-1, 267, at 269. Furthermore,
any period of service as members of a prior partnership will not be
credited as a period of employment for purposes of the above section.
The contrary position expressed in the case of United States v. Arthur
R. Kintner et ux., 216 F.2d 418, will not be accepted by the Internal
Revenue Service as a precedent in the disposition of other cases involv-
ing similar fact situations."8
In a letter of clarification on Revenue Ruling 56-23, the Direc-
tor of the Tax Rulings Division said :4
In declining to accept the decision in United States v. Kintner, et ux.,
216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), as a precedent in the disposition of
similar cases the Internal Revenue Service decided to continue to hold
that groups of medical doctors who adopt the form of an association for
the practice of their profession will not be treated as a corporation for
any purpose of the Internal Revenue Code.... with the exception
which follows ...
The exception mentioned by the Director is contained in the
last paragraph of his letter:
Consistent with Part 2 (b) (1) of Rev. Rul. 33, C. B. 1953-1, 267,
the next to last sentence of Rev. Rul. 56-23, supra, was added to make
clear our intended position with respect to the prior service of doctors
(and others, for that matter) who have operated a partnership and
thereafter actually incorporate (in a State permitting such incorpora-
tion) for the practice of the medical profession and then have the cor-
poration establish a past and future service pension or other such plan
6s Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 4, p. 9.
64 Letter of Clarification from H. T. Swartz, Director, Tax Rulings Division, Internal
Revenue Service, to Richard L. Mackay, Attorney, Dallas, Texas, dated March 7, 1956.
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for all employees, including the doctors and other members of the prior
partnership. The sentence also makes clear the policy we intend to fol-
low in any case where an individual might change from the status of a
partner to that of a bona fide employee of the partnership, or of a suc-
cessor to the partnership, and thereafter become a participant under the
employer's pension or other such plan for employees.
CONCLUSION.
It is submitted that the Commissioner has erred in his continu-
ing stand against precedent established by the courts, and in the
clear language of the Internal Revenue Code and his own Regula-
tions in the matter of associations taxable as corporations for per-
sons practicing the learned professions. By apparently intending
to accept pension plans, and associate or stockholder-doctors as
employees, for professional persons in states where the practice of
a profession is listed as a "corporate purpose," he will create and
has created discrimination against the vast majority of persons
practicing a profession in those states not permitting incorpora-
tion. At the present time, the only taxpayers not eligible for cov-
erage under a pension plan set up by their own organization are
the professional persons engaged in their professions. Perhaps
with sufficient pressure the discrimination will cease in the same
way that community property state and non-community property
state taxpayers were equalized in division of income for tax
purposes.
Does the association, form of doing business by professional
persons violate public policy? Apparently not, since the associa-
tion is, in effect, a super-partnership. The associates are Still indi-
vidually and severally liable for debts of the association, while
malpractice or misfeasance liability attaches to the wrongdoer.
Under common law, and all state laws, the association, as dis-
tinguished from the corporate form with limited liability, is a
legitimate vehicle for conducting professional practice.
A second major tenet of public policy is preservation of confi-
dential and privileged communications between doctor-patient,
attorney-client, etc. A corporate form would prevent this, since a
separate legal entity, an "artificial person," would stand between
the doctor or attorney and his patient or client, respectively. The
association, not being a separate legal entity, could not sever this
relationship.
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